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SHOES THAT DID NOT DROP
Richard Marcus*
It is not possible to capture the essence of Ed Cooper: his spirit
and intelligence suffuse the rules process (and probably other
processes as well). What that process produces, he improves. What
that process receives, he evaluates. All who have been involved in
that process have been enriched by Ed. I can therefore only write
about a small piece of his pervasive influence.
I take "Shoes That Did Not Drop"' as my topic because I appreci-
ate, by now, that what the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules does
not do is, in some ways, as important as what it does. Similarly, the
decision not to do something is equally important as, and may be
more difficult than, the decision to do something. It may some-
times seem that amending the Rules is too easy. GregJoseph once
said that they are amended as often as the telephone book.2 Some
even think that it was a mistake to create a Rules Committee.3 These
reactions are overstated, however. Amendments do not and should
not happen often. Amending the rules is not easy and should not
be.
But a general appreciation of those truths does not mean that it
is obvious when to go forward and when not to do so. There are
certainly times when the clamor for action is very loud, and the risk
of seeming to be a "do-nothing" body is unnerving. Sometimes that
* Horace 0. Coil '57 Chair in Litigation, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. Since 1996, I have served as Associate Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, for which Ed Cooper has served as Reporter since 1992. This paper builds on March
22, 2012 remarks in Ann Arbor honoring Ed's first twenty years of service to the Committee.
1. This expression is derived from the phrase "waiting for the other shoe to drop" that
described early twentieth-century tenement life, when sounds from the apartment above
could be easily heard. It is often used in legal parlance. See, for example, United States v.
Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004), affd, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which Judge Posner
wrote that a recent Supreme Court decision "let the other shoe drop."
2. Gregory P.Joseph, Rule Traps, 30 LITIGATION 6, 6 (2003) ("The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure change with the telephone directory. Every year, something is tweaked, torn,
wrenched, or rewritten. Most of this is merely annoying. Sometimes, though, buried amid the
clutter is an amendment that carries a real wallop for major aspects of practice.").
3. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects of Procedural Progress, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 761, 761 (1993):
[T]his Symposium's topic recalls what a prominent Manhattan lawyer remarked over
lunch at an American Law Institute meeting several years ago: "The worst thing they
ever did for civil litigation was to create a standing committee on the civil rules." Hav-
ing a standing committee meant somebody was always tinkering with the rules; it
would be better, he felt, to leave the rules alone and to trust their evolution to careful
judicial interpretation.
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clamor may come from representatives of Congress, which can
make inaction seem a particularly dubious outcome. Moreover,
compared to the rulemaking titans of the past, it may seem that we
are pygmies in the present, unable to get much of anything of con-
sequence off the ground.4
So I thought I would reflect on some things that we 5 did not try
to get off the ground, or that we allowed to fall to the ground, and
pay tribute in this way to the enduring gentle guidance we have
received from Ed.
I. SHOES THAT DID DROP
By way of contrast, I will begin with a couple of examples of shoes
that did drop. Perhaps those experiences can illuminate the risks of
responding to clamor for change without sufficient appreciation of
the results of the change.
A. Rule 11 in 1983
The 1970s were a time of great and growing clamor about exces-
sive litigation-both in terms of the number of cases and the level
of litigation activity in cases. 6 In a way, the notion of complex litiga-
tion got its birth during that decade with some mega-litigations,
such as United States v. IBM, a case of such popular prominence that
it even made it into Doonesbury in 1982,7 around the time the
United States finally dropped the case.8
4. See Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 901-03
(2002) (contrasting the pathbreaking work of the rulemaking titans of the past with the
much more cautious product of contemporary rulemaking).
5. By "we," I really mean the Advisory Committee.
6. For one vivid exploration of these topics, consider the 1976 "Pound Conference," so
called to recognize the seventieth anniversary of a famous 1906 speech that Roscoe Pound
made to the ABA about procedural reform. See generally Addresses Delivered at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70
F.R.D. 79 (1976).
7. See RiCHARD L. MARcus, EDWARD F, SHERMAN & HOWARD M. ERICHSON, COMPLEX Lrri-
CATION 1 (5th ed. 2010) (Doonesbuy cartoon about "the IBM anti-trust suit" opposite the first
page of the book).
8. See In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the dis-
trict court exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to review the government's decision to
dismiss. the case). This decision has recently been back in the news as bearing on the propri-
ety of Judge Jed Rakoff's refusal to approve an SEC settlement of charges arising from the
recent financial meltdown. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal with Citigroup,
N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at Al.
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Although this tumult gave rise first to an effort to narrow the
scope of discovery (eventually ditched), 9 the 1983 amendments
were the true rulemaking watershed it produced. That year saw the
adoption of key changes to Rule 16,10 and the first endorsement in
the rules of something that is now widely recognized as critical to
effective supervision of civil litigation: case management.1' We con-
tinue to build on that foundation.
That's not what the 1983 amendments became famous for, how-
ever. It was also the year Rule 11 was changed from a totally insignif-
icant rule' 2 into something like a monster. The general idea seems
sensible in retrospect-tell lawyers they have some responsibility for
the positions they take in court. But the actual results of the rule
change were almost certainly far beyond what its framers had in
mind. 13 Rule 11 motions proliferated, some courts regarded the
rule as a basis for reversing the American Rule on recoverability of
attorneys' fees, and litigation became nasty, or nastier.14 As Profes-
sor Elliott has recently written:
From 1983 to 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ex-
perimented with mandatory imposition of sanctions under
Rule 11. Most commentators agree that this experiment with
9. See Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 756-60
(1998) (describing the 1978-1980 consideration of altering the scope of discovery).
10. For the current versions of this sort of change in the rules, see FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b),
which requires a "scheduling order" in most civil cases. For a description of the case-manage-
ment movement that lay behind this addition to the Rules, see Robert F. Peckham, The Fed-
eraljudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L.
REv. 770 (1981).
11. See Marcus, supra note 9, at 760-64 (describing a shift to case management as focus
of rulemaking). For contemporary criticism, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HIARv. L.
REv. 374 (1982).
12. SeeD. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 37 (1976) (stating that there was only
one reported instance of striking a complaint on Rule 11 grounds under the 1938 version of
the rule after it went into effect).
13. There is at least some room to be unsure about what the rulemakers expected to
happen. Although some warned about increased Rule 11 activity, others worried that the rule
change would cut off existing enforcement. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Lerner & Seth M. Schwartz,
Why Rule 11 Shouldn't Be Changed, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1983, at 13 (arguing that "elimination of
the motion to strike would effectively emasculate proposed Rule 11").
14. For reports on the results of the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, see, for example, AM.
JUDICATURE Soc'y, REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 11 (Stephen Burbank ed., 1989). See also ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FED JUDICIAL
CTR., RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of Ameri-
can Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 1925 (1989).
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mandatory financial sanctions for frivolous cases and motions
was a disaster. 15
In 1990, the Committee issued an unprecedented call for com-
ments on changing Rule 11,16 and in 1993, the rule was changed
into essentially its present form. Although there have been occa-
sional rumblings from Congress about undoing the 1993 changes, 17
it surely seems, as the Federal Judicial Center has shown more than
once, that the reformed Rule 11 is working much better than the
1983 version.
B. Initial Disclosure
Initial disclosure is actually a very good idea'8 whose time never
came. The general notion-endorsed by such luminaries as Judge
Schwarzer' 9-was to get out the "core information" early and
thereby accelerate the discovery process and achieve the goals of
Rule 1. Maybe that was simply not achievable at the time.20 Maybe it
is not achievable now.
It does seem that the rulemakers did not appreciate how much
opposition they would encounter. In 1991, they put out a draft rule
that would require disclosure of any information that "bears signifi-
cantly" on claims or defenses likely to arise in the action. 2' This
sounds somewhat like the kind of information lawyers in the U.K.
supposedly already exchange without much ado.
Even suggesting such a shift, however, caused much ado in the
United States. Opposition arose at every turn; the proposal pro-
voked "a flood of objections unprecedented in 50-plus years ofjudi-
cial rule-making." 22 At first, the Committee backed off, but then it
15. E. Donald Elliott, Twombly in Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) is Uncon-
stitutional, 64 FLA. L. REv. 895, 909 n.57 (2012).
16. See Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2011, H.R. 966, 112th Cong. (2011).
18. By this, I mean that prompt and reliable disclosure of the "core" materials would
surely avoid enormous expenditures of money and time that result from our current "hide-
the-ball" practices. For that solution to work, however, one would need to be confident that
there would be prompt and reliable disclosure.
19. See William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversay Process, and Discovey Reform,
50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703 (1989) (endorsing a regime of disclosure).
20. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 805-12.
21. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-89 (1991).
22. Ann Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovey; Litigators Erupt, Kill Plan to Reform Federal
Civil Rules, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1.
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proceeded with a revised rule that required disclosure only as to
"disputed facts alleged with particularity," 23 thereby perhaps giving
lawyers an incentive (or disincentive) to make particularized allega-
tions. More significantly, the rule allowed a local opt-out, which
around half the districts used, producing a welter of different dis-
closure regimes across the land.
This was not a happy story. National uniformity matters, and on
something this basic it may matter more than it does on other top-
ics. Eventually, uniformity was restored in 2000, but only to require
disclosure of witnesses and documents the disclosing party might
use to support its claims and defenses. 24 And we are told that even
these reduced disclosure obligations rarely achieve their desired re-
sults, 25 although arguments are frequently made that evidence prof-
fered at trial or summary judgment should be excluded under Rule
37(c) (1) on the ground it was not disclosed when it should have
been.2 6
II. SHOES THAT DID NOT DROP
Amendments can have disturbing effects, and choosing them
wisely is important. There are a number of examples of shoes that
did not drop, or proposed changes that were retracted, that seem
worthy of note. Here are a few.
A. Rule 23
Certainly, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were a big deal, but it
is not so clear that Committee members at the time appreciated
their eventual importance. Arthur Miller, who was actually with the
Committee in 1966, told the Committee in 1997 that the future im-
portance of class actions had not been clear.27 In 1979, he wrote
23. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMs, H.R. Doc. No.
103-74 (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431 (1993). This is the version adopted in 1993; it
was changed to the present version, and made nationally uniform, in 2000.
24. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(1).
25. This statement is based on repeated reports to the Advisory Committee from lawyers
that initial disclosure is not usually very effective. This is not to say that disclosure is entirely
useless but only that it is often questioned by the bar.
26. See 8B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARcus, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE § 2289.1 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing motions to exclude evidence on the
grounds that it was not disclosed at the proper time).
27. Prof. Miller testified about the 1996 proposals to amend Rule 23 and provided back-
ground about the attitudes and expectations at the time that the rule amendments were
adopted in the 1960s:
WINTER 2013]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
about how startlingly class actions had grown in importance during
the first decade after the amendments and how much they had pro-
voked a reaction. 28 A decade later, some predicted their demise.29
As we now know, those predictions were wrong.30
But there is reason to doubt that the Committee fully appreci-
ated in 1966 that something this big was afoot. For a quarter cen-
tury after 1966, it did not give serious consideration to amending
Rule 23. Then in 1991-prompted in part by the challenge of
If anybody can claim to have been there at creation, I was there at creation. If anyone
can claim to tell you what was in Ben's mind [referring to Ben Kaplan, Reporter of the
Committee at the time] or the Committee's mind, John [Frank] comes close, but I
yield not to John. Nothing was in the Committee's mind. And anyone who tells you
that wondrous things were going on with direct relevance to the year 1997, it's good
story telling.Just put yourself back in 1960 to '63. Nothing was going on. There were a
few antitrust cases, a few securities cases. The civil rights legislation was then putative.
You did not have due process legislation; you did not have safety legislation; you did
not have the environmental or consumer legislation. And the rule was not thought of
as having the kind of application that it now has.
That doesn't tell you a thing about what the rule should be used for. But you can't
blame the rule, because we have had the most incredible upheaval in federal substan-
tive law in the history of the nation between 1963 and 1983, coupled with judicially
created doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, now codified in the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute.
It's a new world. It's a new world that imposes on this Committee problems of enor-
mous delicacy. And you're shooting at a moving target, as I say in my written re-
marks .... It's deja vu all over again. We had this debate in the '70s about the utility of
the class action. We're having it again.
Arthur R. Miller, Testimony at Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Jan. 17, 1997, San Francisco, at 64-65 (on file with author).
28. See Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth,
Reality, and the "Class Action Problem,"92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979) (describing "holy war
over Rule 23" waged by "segments of the bench and bar").
29. See, e.g., Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 1988, at B7 (reporting a substantial decline in the number of cases filed as class actions
and asserting that "class actions had their day in the sun and kind of petered out").
30. In 1997, for example, Judge Paul Niemeyer, then Chair of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, testified before Congress that the class action was "transforming the litigation
landscape" and that "[c]lass actions are being certified at unprecedented rates, and they are
involving a substantial [number], if not a majority of American citizens." Senate Subcommit-
tee Holds Hearing on Class Action Litigation Reform, 66 U.S.L.W. 2294 (Nov. 16, 1997). Five
years later, two litigators wrote that "the class action device has changed from the more or
less rare case fought out by titans of the bar in top financial centers of the nation to the
veritable bread and butter of firms of all shapes and sizes across the country." Benjamine
Reid & Chris S. Coutroulis, Checkmate in Class Actions: Defensive Strategy in the Initial Moves, 28
LrnG.AnON 21, 21 (2002).
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dealing with asbestos personal injury litigation 31-the Judicial Con-
ference urged the Committee to take another look at Rule 23.32
This led to a five-year reform effort that began with serious con-
sideration of a proposal to junk the current structure of Rule 23 (b)
and replace it with a much more discretionary arrangement. 3 Such
a change might have seemed in keeping with the shift from the
original, highly formalistic Rule 23(b) to the more functional ver-
sion adopted in 1966. But making that shift would involve discard-
ing a quarter century of experience under the existing rule.
Eventually the complete rewrite was shelved. Attention focused
on Rule 23(b) (3), and various "improvements" of its factors were
devised. Meanwhile, the Third Circuit seemed to require that the
district court conduct a full litigation certification review even if the
parties proposed a settlement. That approach could have scotched
the possibility of settlement-class certification even though many
circuits had found it very useful. 34 So the Advisory Committee
proposed a new Rule 23(b) (4) to provide authority for such certifi-
cation for settlement.3 5 Moreover, the absence of a ready route for
appellate review of class certification decisions prompted a propo-
sal to add Rule 23(f). 36
The Committee submitted these ideas for public comment in Au-
gust 1996. It got a big reaction. Eventually the Committee pub-
lished a four-volume compilation of those comments37 that
included a letter signed by more than one hundred law professors
protesting various aspects of the amendment package.3 Very seri-
ous questions were raised about many aspects of the Rule 23(b) (3)
changes. And the Supreme Court granted cert. in Amchem, eventu-
ally firmly, but gently, telling the Third Circuit it was wrong about
31. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc
COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1991) (recommending congressional action to deal
with challenges of this form of litigation).
32. See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24
Miss. C. L. REV. 323, 347 (2005).
33. See id. at 347-50.
34. See In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 824 (1995).
35. See Proposed Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 539 (1996) (presenting a proposed addition of
new Rule 23 (b) (4)).
36. See id. at 560.
37. See 1-4 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23 (1997).
38. Letter from Steering Committee to Oppose Proposed Rule 23 to Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 28, 1996) in 2 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES, WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23 1-9 (1997).
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using exactly the same standards for litigation and settlement
certification.39
The public hearing process is a great boon to the Committee and
produced understandable second thoughts in 1997. Only the Rule
23(f) proposal went forward,40 and it has indeed produced a body
of appellate law on class certification that has contributed to signifi-
cant changes in the way class actions are handled.
Meanwhile, building on its experience, the Committee returned
to Rule 23 to examine not its certification criteria but its processes
for managing class actions. This effort led to changes published for
comment in 2001 and was also the subject of wide interest. But this
time the reaction was not nearly so radioactive, and the changes
went forward (with modifications) and became effective some nine
years ago.41
Along with other things (CAFA42 comes to mind), the 2003
amendments produced changes that contribute to the current re-
view of Rule 23 issues.43 That review has identified a considerable
variety of issues for consideration, but that development hardly
means another set of Rule 23 shoes will soon be dropping.
B. E-Discovery
Discovery has been on the Committee's calendar fairly continu-
ously for a third of a century. For the last decade or so, e-discovery
has surely been the biggest feature of it. More than fifteen years
ago, lawyers criticized the Committee's focus on discovery issues as
"fighting the last war" because they did not deal with the challenges
39. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) ("We agree with peti-
tioners to this limited extent: Settlement is relevant to class certification. The Third Circuit's
opinion bears modification in that respect.").
40. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (f).
41. See FED. R. Cry. P. 23(c), (e) (amended 2003); 23(g), (h) (added 2003).
42. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).
43. See Memo Regarding Rule 23 Issues, in ADviSORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RUEs,
AGENDA MATERIALS TO THE ADVISORY COMMI-EE ON CIVL RULES MEETING, ANN ARBOR, MI
449-644 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rnles/
Agenda% 20Books/Civil/CV2012-03.pdf.
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of email discovery.- By late 1998, public hearings on other discov-
ery amendments included criticisms that there was nothing in the
pending amendment package to address e-discovery.45
There was a reason for that omission-the Committee did not
feel confident that it had a sure grasp of the problems presented by
e-discovery and certainly did not know what to do about them. In
2000, it made a sustained effort to find out more.46 Although many
urged that it act quickly, few had clear ideas about what that
prompt action should include, and the whole project was put on
hold. Only in 2003 did the Committee feel that it had gained a
sufficient understanding to begin to devise changes that had prom-
ise of success. Actually, those changes, adopted in 2006, were direct
descendants of similar changes circulated for discussion as early as
March 2000. But the learning curve is steep for many of the Com-
mittee's tasks, and that shoe was not ready to drop in 2000.
It seems that the 2006 amendments have done some good, and
complaints that they have also done some harm seem unpersuasive
(e.g., would it really be better to deal with these problems without
rules?). Many states have adopted rules or statutes that track what
the Committee did.47
Now we are presented with some unfinished business from the
2006 amendments-coping with the burdens and challenges of
preserving electronically stored information. Again, we are
presented with calls that we act with alacrity. Again, we are im-
mersed in the difficult task of figuring out what exactly the
problems are and how exactly a rule change can produce positive
effects. As discussion during the March 2012 meeting in Ann Arbor
44. This notion first emerged for the Committee during a January 1997 miniconference
on discovery issues in San Francisco. For background on the evolution of the Committee's
treatment of these issues, see generally Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemak-
ing Responses to E-Discovery, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1 (2004).
45. See Allen Black, Testimony at Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, Dec. 7, 1998, Baltimore, at 22-23 (protesting that the proposed
amendments would do nothing to take account of the growing importance of electronically
stored information in discovery) (on file with author).
46. For a display of discussion issues about possible amendment ideas, see Memoran-
dum from Richard Marcus, Special Reporter, to Participants in Mini-Conference on Elec-
tronic Discovery at Brooklyn Law School on Oct. 27, 2000 (Sept. 26, 2000), in AGENDA BOOK
FOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CtVIL RuLEs tab 8 (2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2000-10.pdf.
47. See Thomas Y. Allman & James Ancone, E-Discovery in State Courts, in 4 ELECrRONIC
DiSCOVERY DESKBOOK, at 31 (PLI, Course Handbook Ser. No. 38154, 2012).
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showed, the eventual outcome of this consideration remains far
from certain. 48
C. Pleading
We are all so transfixed by Twombly and Iqbal that we may forget
that the pleading ball was tossed into the Committee's lap almost
twenty years ago by the Supreme Court's decision in Leatherman,49
which stated that courts could not engraft heightened pleading
standards onto the rules to address problems resulting from per-
ceived drawbacks of looser standards. While holding that the rules
did not contemplate such judicial innovation, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist was clear that the Committee could decide to change the rules
through the amendment process. 50
Thus invited, the Committee did consider that possibility. 5' I be-
lieve that was one of Ed's first tasks as Reporter, and eventually-
after the sort of thorough evaluation that always occurs under Ed's
guidance-the Committee decided not to pursue the topic.
Now, as we know, the shoe is somewhat on the other foot. The
Court has acted on its own. Some urge that it inappropriately side-
stepped the rules process. Many yearn for the careful consideration
the Committee's process affords. You could say that what the Court
needed, but did not have, was Ed. But it hardly seems likely that
more effort twenty years ago would have had a profound effect on
the current situation.
So we find ourselves again pondering the possibilities of revising
pleading standards. 52 Particularly in the current context, this raises
a profoundly challenging set of issues. Fortunately we have Ed to
identify the alternatives and evaluate them thoroughly and
dispassionately.
48. For a review of the issues, see AGENDA MATERIALS TO ADVISORY COMMIrEE ON CIVIL
RuLs MEETING, ANN ARBOR, MI 249-304 (2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2012-0 3 .pdf.
49. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163 (1993).
50. See id. at 168 ("Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against munici-
palities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b).
But that is a result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules,
and not by judicial interpretation.").
51. SeeAIWiSORy COMMrITEE ON C1VIL RULES, MEETING MINUTES, Washington, D.C. 17-18
(May 3-5, 1993) (describing discussion of Rule 9(b)).
52. See, for example, the brief treatment of pleading issues in the AGENDA MAT'ERLALS TO
THE ADVISORY COMMIrEE ON CnWL RuLES MEETING, ANN ARBOR, MI, at 311-14 (Mar. 22-23,
2004).
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D. Rule 68
A final brief example rounds out my chronicle. Many in the
1980s and early 1990s embraced Rule 68 as a wonderful model for
curing various ills thought to afflict federal-court litigation. 53 Some
states had more vigorous versions of the same sort of rule, and the
federal version seemed inappropriately to equip defendants to ap-
ply pressure to plaintiffs but not the other way around. Moreover,
after Marek v. Chesny,5 4 it seemed that the rule applied acute pres-
sure only in the very cases in which it looked like Congress wanted
to encourage lawyers to take plaintiffs' cases and encourage plain-
tiffs to seek relief in court.55
It is difficult to recapture now the variety of Rube-Goldbergesque
rule proposals that the Rule 68 discussion included. Suffice to say
that they proved Tom Rowe's observation that thinking about attor-
ney-fee awards actually turns out to be very complicated. 56 And
Steve Burbank vigorously urged that, as to all of these ideas, it was
"time to abandon ship. 5 7
Rule 68 has not gone away, but amendment proposals have also
not gone forward. From time to time ideas for revision come up. I
recall particularly that the Second Circuit proposed amending the
rule in a 2006 decision.58 And I admit to being lured in that direc-
tion, perhaps because I had endorsed some thoughts along those
lines.59 But Ed quickly brought me up short. He had thought
through all the permutations of the rule in a way that nobody else
53. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers ofJudgment-An Approach to Reducing
the Cost of Litigation, 76 JunIcAua 147 (1992). Rule 68 permits a defendant to make an
"offer ofjudgment" to a plaintiff, and if the plaintiff proceeds with the litigation but does not
obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's post-offer costs of
suit. See FED. R. Crv. P. 68.
54. 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
55. Marek involved a claim based on a statute subject to an attorney fee shifting provision
that said fees were recoverable "as a part of costs." The Court held that because Rule 68 also
spoke of a "costs" award the making of a Rule 68 offer of judgment prevented a successful
plaintiff from recovering post-offer costs (including attorney fees) unless the plaintiff won
more than the amount offered.
56. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 139, 140 (1984) (asserting that predicting the effects of fee shifting turns out to
be "surprisingly complex").
57. Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 425 (1986).
58. See Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 2006) (recom-
mending that the Advisory Committee address the method of determining whether a Rule 68
offer of judgment is superior to the judgment ultimately entered when both deal with non-
monetary relief).
59. See 12 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHRD L. MARcus, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE & PROCEDURE, § 3006.1 at 127 (2d ed. 1997), quoted in Reiter, 457 F.3d at 230.
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had done. He had myriad versions of possible amendments that
pursued and highlighted those difficulties. His patient dismantling
of all the issues showed that this was not a route that could easily
lead in a productive direction.60 The Rule 68 amendment idea
faded from the docket, Second Circuit recommendation
notwithstanding.
III. UBIQUITOUS ED
It is probably a good thing that many ideas fade from the docket.
Quite a few more items that appeared briefly (or not so briefly) but
eventually disappeared occur to me, but seem not worthy of men-
tion here. My basic point is that Ed has been ubiquitous in the cru-
cial process of evaluating and discarding those ideas that do not
pass muster. As he is central to all aspects of Civil Rules activity (the
most important branch of rules activity), he unquestionably serves
as the acid test for ideas that die on the vine.
What's critical to appreciate is that Ed does this crucial job by
embracing and pursuing ideas, by exploring them more fully than
the people who propose them have done, and thereby revealing the
flaws or problems that the rest of us would figure out only years
afterwards. On that score, I have three examples, all drawn from
our class-action experience.
First, after the collapse of the 1996 proposed amendments, Ed
undertook to see what could be designed as a truly aggressive and
effective reshaping of class actions and related techniques to im-
prove the handling of mass torts in federal court. What he devised
was clearly "outside the box"-a rather breathtaking leap into the
unknown. 61 So far as I know, it went beyond what anyone else had
put forth as even a discussion topic. I was so startled by the proposal
that it prompted me to invoke Senator Moynihan's "benign neg-
lect" image as a less risky alternative. 62 So Ed clearly can imagine
things others cannot. But he also sees the attendant risks and hardly
insists on pursuing them. Benign neglect did not control, but the
actual rulemaking agenda was much less ambitious.
60. See Rule 68: A Progress Report, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RuLEs, AGENDA MATER-
IALS TO ADviSORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RuLEs MEETING, BROOKLYN, N.Y. (Apr. 19-20, 2007).
61. See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
1943 (2000).
62. See Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2009, 2012
(2000).
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Second, that agenda included the notion that a rule would be a
good way to address whether class members could appeal the dis-
trict court's approval of a proposed settlement if they objected to
the proposed deal. Some courts had held that class members who
opposed the settlement had "standing" to appeal the court's ap-
proval of the settlement only if they were granted leave to inter-
vene.63 As a practical matter of litigation management, there was
something to be said for permitting the district judge thus to police
objections; certainly, the Committee heard much about bad-faith,
blackmailing objectors who extorted money by threatening to
string out the settlement process through a lengthy appeal,64 and
giving the judge the power to cut off that possibility had much to
recommend it. But as Ed pointed out, there could be serious ques-
tions about using a civil rule to try to decide matters of appellate
standing. Moreover, since the class-action settlement would extin-
guish the class members' claims-except to the extent they had
rights under the settlement-there would seem to be standing even
though no rule said so. Under such wise guidance, this idea was
jettisoned. Years later, on literally the eve of final presentation of
what became the 2003 Rule 23 amendments to the Standing Com-
mittee, the Supreme Court decided Devlin v. Scardeletti,65 holding
that objecting class members may appeal from denial of their objec-
tions. Having a rule proposal addressing the same thing just then
would have been awkward at best. Thank goodness Ed's work
showed that this was not the way to go.
Third, the problem of overlapping class actions was another re-
current headache, as were efforts at gaming the class-action system
by seeking certification in multiple courts or shopping proposed
settlements until some judge, somewhere, was willing to approve
what others had not.66 Could the Committee solve these problems?
There were large obstacles to doing so, but Ed was able to develop
63. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RuLEs, AGENDA MATERIALS TO ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON CIVIL RULES MEETING, TUCSON, AZ (Oct. 16-17, 2000) (offering a proposed new Rule
23(g) entitled "Appeal Standing").
64. This was a recurrent theme during the long process of developing and revising the
2003 amendments to Rule 23.
65. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
66. Judge Frank Easterbrook provided a classic statement of the concern:
Suppose that every state in the nation would as a matter of first principles deem inap-
propriate a nationwide class covering these claims and products. What this might
mean in practice is something like "9 of 10 judges in every state would rule against
certifying a nationwide class" . . . . Although the 10% that see things otherwise are a
distinct minority, one is bound to turn up if plaintiffs file enough suits-and, if one
nationwide class is certified, then all the no-certification decisions fade into insignifi-
cance. A single positive trumps all the negatives.
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ingenious rule-based ways of giving fairly binding effect to denials
of class certification and refusals to approve proposed class settle-
ments. Those proposals were so thoughtful that they were pub-
lished along with actual amendment proposals to permit
discussion. 67 But they also were so thorough that they educated the
Committee, and it decided not to try to address these issues by rule.
Again, Ed was thinking outside the box, and again, his creativity
enabled the Committee to decide to stay inside the box. Just last
Term, in Smith v. Bayer Corporation,68 the Court confirmed the wis-
dom of that discretion, although it included a cryptic footnote
about possible rulemaking on the subject.6
9
Again and again, Ed is willing and able to appreciate and pursue
new ideas with unflagging enthusiasm. Nobody else is as open to
rethinking things at every stage of the process. But nobody else is as
capable of seeing (after fully exploring an idea) that it really should
not be pursued. That's why the shoes that should not drop don't
drop, and why I decided to pay tribute to this feature of his service
that does not get enough attention.
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 766-67 (7th Cir.
2003).
67. See ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RuLEs, MEETING MINUTES 40-41 (Oct. 22-23,
2001) (describing panel discussion of "unpublished" proposals regarding overlapping, dupli-
cative, and competitive class actions).
68. 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011) (holding that the Anti-Injunction Act forbids federal-court
injunction against state-court certification of a class that the federal court had refused to
certify).
69. See id. at 2382 n.12 (observing that the Court's decision did not "at all address the
permissibility of a change to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to this
possibility").
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